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A state of underdevelopment: Sovereignty, nation-build-
ing and labour in Liberia 1898-1961 
Christine Whyte  1
University of Kent 
Abstract 
In the 19th and early 20th century, Liberia was in the unusual position of being a colony with no 
metropole. Without military or financial support, the settlers’ control over their territory remained 
weak. Surrounding European empires preyed on this weakness and Americo-Liberian rule was often 
at risk from coalitions of European forces and indigenous African resistance. From the early 20th cen-
tury, then, the political elite took on the concept of “development” as a central part of government 
policy in an attempt to gain political and economic control of the hinterland areas and stave off Eu-
ropean incursions. This policy involved the extension and reinforcement of labor policies and prac-
tices which had developed through the 19th century as means to incorporate settlers and indigenous 
people into Liberian society. When these plans failed, huge swathes of territory were turned over to 
foreign commercial interests in an attempt to bolster Liberian claims to sovereignty. And after the 
Second World War, new policies of “community development” introduced by international agencies 
again tried to solve Liberia’s “land and labor” problem through resettlement. At each stage develop-
mentalist rationales were deployed in order to facilitate greater government control over the Liberian 
interior territory.  
Liberia and Development  
“Development” became central to Liberian government policy from the end of the 19th cen-
tury. The sovereignty of this African republic was repeatedly challenged in this period on the 
basis of its lack of “effective occupation” of the areas outside its coastal settlements by both 
European colonial governments and international observers. The Liberian economic and po-
litical elite used “development” as the rationale to violently enforce political control; to court 
foreign investment from both private business and international and government agencies; 
and to expropriate land. In many ways, the practice of development in 20th century Liberia 
drew on and worked alongside a pre-existing “civilising mission” which had legitimised the 
exploitation of the indigenous population for manual labour and deprived them of the right to 
own land.  
 The author would like to thank the anonymous ILWCH reviewers for their insightful comments and construc1 -
tive feedback on this text and Benedetta Rossi for being the inspiration and driving force behind this special 
issue. The research for this article was funded by the Leverhulme Trust and supported by the Centre for the His-
tory of Colonialisms at the University of Kent. 
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Unlike the other areas under scrutiny in this special issue, Liberia was an independent African 
republic. However, a small elite, described by a League of Nations head of investigation 
commission as a “closed family community,” controlled much of the nation’s economic and 
political life until the 1980 coup and ensuing civil war.  Before this, Liberian society mir2 -
rored many of the structures of the colonial state in Africa. But in the late nineteenth century, 
the Liberian government found itself under threat from encroaching European colonial pow-
ers and sought to stave off their claims to its territories by making the concept of “develop-
ment” central to governance. For the Liberian government “development” was, as Frederick 
Cooper terms it, an “indigenous category”, one which the Americo-Liberian controlled gov-
ernment self-consciously deployed from the early 20th century to describe their own activi-
ties.  They pursued “development” first, by recruiting and deploying a military force to en3 -
force political control, then by encouraging a private corporation to develop rural areas, and 
finally by accepting U.S. and then U.N. aid to build infrastructure.  
By handing some of their control over economic and material development to outside influ-
ences, the Liberian government hoped to maintain its hold on political power. This would 
have profound influences on the lives of the people who would work to implement these am-
bitious development programmes. Workers were torn between competing sets of obligations: 
on one hand to be wage labourers in private plantations; on the other hand, to fulfil expected 
“communal labour” duties. By the 1960s, it appeared as though the government’s develop-
ment programme had failed. Despite a period of exponential economic growth, Liberia was 
described as “an extreme example of underdevelopment.” This diagnosis of a state of “under-
development” was blamed on “traditional social organisation, culture, and politics.”  The 4
lifestyle and working habits of the indigenous population were regarded as the main obstacles 
to economic and social improvement and were the target of the state’s intervention. In the 
view of the Americo-Liberian government, themselves descendants of freed slaves from the 
Americas, Africans had to be taught how to perform manual labour, to become industrious 
citizens and thus, part of the political process.  
 Cuthbert Christy, “Liberia in 1930,” The Geographical Journal 77 (1931): 515–40.2
 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkley, 2005), 7. 3
 George Dalton, “History, Politics, and Economic Development in Liberia,” The Journal of Econom4 -
ic History 25 (1965): 569–91, 571.
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The first section of the paper briefly summarises the establishment and colonial occupation of 
the Liberian Republic.  It highlights how a two-tier system emerged in Liberia over the 
course of the 19th century, dividing the descendants of settlers from the local population, but 
also how apprenticeship schemes were used to incorporate both new arrivals and native peo-
ple into their settlements. The second section examines how the Liberian state initially used 
the idea of “developing the hinterland” in order to stave off early European efforts to either 
encroach on its borders or to take the republic over outright. The third section looks at “priva-
tized development” in the inter-war period, when the government relinquished some control 
over economic and material development to the Firestone corporation, in an effort to maintain 
their minority rule. The final section looks at US American aid and United Nations develop-
ment co-operation in the post-war period when the “problem” of Liberian underdevelopment 
became the source of international attention.  
Migration and Colonisation  
A variety of “push” and “pull” factors brought free Blacks and emancipated slaves from the 
United States to the Grain Coast. The American Colonisation Society (ACS) sponsored many 
of these migrants throughout the 19th century, though a few funded their own passage. Some 
were emancipated by their masters on condition that they emigrate; others sought out the op-
portunities presented by trade in West Africa. Between 1820 and 1870, around 13,000 set-
tlers, most born and raised in the United States, made new homes in settlements spread along 
the coast from the Gallinas River to Cape Palmas.  Liberia’s national motto proclaims, “The 5
Love of Liberty Brought Us Here” and its citizens benefited from a progressive convergence 
of trans-Atlantic notions of race, emancipation, and politics. They brought with them the le-
gal knowledge and zeal for freedom which allowed them to write a revolutionary constitution 
for the newly-founded Republic which abolished slavery, restricted ownership of property to 
Africans and their descendants and enshrined the economic rights of women.   6
 Histories of the ACS settlers have primarily focused on movements from particular US American 5
states.
 William E. Allen, “Liberia and the Atlantic World in the Nineteenth Century: Convergence and Ef6 -
fects,” History in Africa 37 (2010): 7–49, 11-12. and Robert T. Brown, “Simon Greenleaf and the 
Liberian Constitution of 1847,” Liberian Studies Journal 9 (1980): 51–66.
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But these progressive policies for settlers and their families contrasted sharply with the re-
pressive and often violent rule enforced on pre-existing communities. Relations had been 
fraught since the establishment of the first settlement where, during negotiations over land at 
Cape Mesurado in 1821, US Navy officer Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton held a gun to the 
head of Dei leader King Peter.  In the following years, communities continued to contest the 7
rights of chiefs to sign away land to the colonists or launched attacks on newly-built towns. 
The settlers, organised into militias, attacked slave-trading forts and struggled to expand the 
reach of their settlements.  The founding of a Department of the Interior in 1868 marked a 8
new phase in Americo-Liberian colonization, as District Commissioners were appointed by 
the government to surveil and tax the native population.  The indigenous inhabitants of the 9
land were designated “aliens” and land was expropriated. 
The settlers were also confronted, from the outset, by a shortage of labour. Thanks to political 
changes in the US through the 19th century, the ACS failed to recruit emigrants in the num-
bers it had anticipated.  In addition to this, the colony was beset in the early years by an ex10 -
tremely high mortality rate.  This led to a shortage of people with which to establish the 11
planned farms and plantations. Even if the settlers survived, the unfamiliar environment, 
crops and lack of North American beasts of burden made agriculture difficult. However, a 
new stock of migrants, between 1846 and 1861, helped the settlers to overcome their labour 
shortage. Some 5,700 freed slaves, hailing from a variety of places in West-Central and 
southern Africa, were brought to the Liberian settlements after they were rescued from slave 
 Eugene S. Van Sickle, “Reluctant Imperialists: the U.S. Navy and Liberia, 1819–1845,” Journal of 7
the Early Republic 31 (2011): 107–34, 109. 
 Harrison Akingbade, “The Liberian Settlers and the Campaign Against the Slave Trade 1825-1865,” 8
Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione dell Istituto Italiano Per l’Africa E l’Oriente 
38 (1983): 339–68.
 J. Gus Liebnow, Liberia: Evolution of Privilege (Ithaca, 1969): 53-59.9
 Eric Burin, Slavery and the Peculiar Solution: A History of the American Colonization Society 10
(Gainesville, 2008): 15-16. 
 Antonio McDaniel discusses the high death rate and its causes in, Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: the 11
Mortality Cost of Colonizing Liberia in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1995).
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ships stopped by the U.S. anti-slave trade patrol.  Known as “Congoes”, they proved to be 12
vital to the working of the colony, providing a vital link between settler and indigenous popu-
lations, and bringing with them essential knowledge about agriculture in Western Africa.  
Americo-Liberians took Congoes on as apprentices, alongside indigenous workers. In 1846, 
settler Peyton Skipwith wrote that now he was “very well situated and has several apprentices 
with me Exclusive of some of the Barque Pons Cargo of Congoes”.  The employment of 13
these “apprentices” served several purposes. First, it filled the labor gap left by the high mor-
tality rate and low numbers of settlers. Second, it provided a means of incorporating the new-
ly-arrived recaptives, who were often only teenagers and completely without family or re-
sources, into settler society.  Finally, the use of such labor in the households of the wealthy 14
freed Americo-Liberians to pursue a so-called “civilised” lifestyle.  The status of “civilised” 15
became central to Liberian life and politics. The 1847 constitution, for example, stated that 
local people could only claim citizenship if they could prove they had “conformed to the 
forms, customs and habits of civilised life.”  This became the key distinction that allowed 16
Americo-Liberians to exclude others from political life. 
The Constitution of 1847 stated that local people could only claim citizenship if they could 
prove they had “conformed to the forms, customs and habits of civilised life.”  It explicitly 17
laid out a mission to prioritise manual labor amongst surrounding communities; “agriculture 
 This was funded by the U.S. Federal government after 1819. Between the abolition of the slave 12
trade to the US and 1819, southern states retained the right to auction the recaptives. See, Eric Burin, 
“The Slave Trade Act of 1819: a New Look at Colonization and the Politics of Slavery,” American 
Nineteenth Century History 13 (2012): 1–14.
 Peyton Skipwith to John Hopewell Coake, Monrovia, June 25, 1846. National Humanities Center 13
Resource Toolbox, The Making of African American Identity: Vol. I, 1500-1865. First published in 
Randall M. Miller, ed., “Dear Master”: Letters of a Slave Family (Cornell, 1978). 756 survivors of the 
slave ship Pons were left at Monrovia in 1845 by the U.S. Africa Squadron.
 The settler press and officials often reacted with alarm at the arrival of hundreds of recaptives. 14
Shick, Behold the Promised Land, 68.
 David Brown provides the most complete description of “civilization” in the Liberian context in, 15
“On the Category ‘Civilised’ in Liberia and Elsewhere”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 20 
(2008): 287–303. In particular he compares it to Gellner’s concept of “bobility”, that is, a status claim 
which established a boundary between the settlers and the native inhabitants.
 Charles Henry Huberich, Political and Legislative History of Liberia, Vol. II, (New York, 1947), 886.16
 Charles Henry Huberich, Political and Legislative History of Liberia, Vol. II, (New York, 1947), 17
886.
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and husbandry” were described as “wholesome branches of industry” for Africans.  Later in 18
the century, Americo-Liberian explorer and educator Benjamin Anderson would make a se-
ries of recommendations to the government intended to aid greater exploitation of the inland 
regions. In particular, he pointed to the danger of “bookishly educating our natives” instead 
of providing training in “manual and artizan [sic] labour”.  Anderson’s advice presaged U.S. 19
American interest in “Industrial Education” for the free African-American population.  This 20
form of training, aimed at transforming African-Americans into industrious workers, was ex-
ported from the U.S. to Liberia through educational schemes, starting with Cuttington Col-
lege in Cape Palmas in 1889.  But as Anderson’s advice and the pre-existing apprenticeship 21
system shows, Americo-Liberians had already put the idea of a “manual education” for native 
Africans into practice.  
From the 1840s, the settlers set off on an expansionist path. The first Black Governor, Joseph 
Jenkins Roberts, who served from 1842 to 1848, embarked on a treaty tour along the coast in 
1842, considerably expanding the colony’s jurisdiction. The governor of Maryland-in-
Liberia, John B. Russwurm, undertook a similar journey in 1846. These treaties demanded 
peaceful relations and assured the colonists access to trade with the surrounding communi-
ties. Coastal expansion was matched by a corresponding exploration of the interior from the 
late 1850s onward in an effort to improve communications and trade. M.B. Akpan charac-
terises this period as an age of “Black Imperialism” as Liberians sought to forestall British 
and French attempts to establish trading posts nearby and to rapidly expand a Liberian sphere 
of civilising influence over surrounding areas.  22
 Taken from the text of the constitution reprinted in C. Abayomi Cassell, Liberia: History of the First 18
African Republic (New York, 1970), 425-30.
 Benjamin Anderson, Narrative of the Expedition Despatched to Musahdu by the Liberian Govern19 -
ment Under Benjamin J. K. Anderson, Sr., Esquire in 1874 (Monrovia, 1912), 40.
 As emancipated slave and educator Booker T. Washington explained: “It has been necessary for the 20
Negro to learn the difference between being worked and working” Booker T. Washington, “Industrial 
Education for the Negro,” in The Negro Problem (New York, 1903): 7–29, 9.
 David McBride, Missions for Science: U.S. Technology and Medicine in America's African World 21
(New Brunswick, 2002), 106. 
 M. B. Akpan, “Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia, 22
1841–1964”, Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 7 
(1973): 217–36
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The Scramble for Liberia 
Faced with internal unrest, economic instability and territorial threats, Americo-Liberians ac-
knowledged a need, from the 1860s onwards, to develop public works and create commercial 
opportunities in the interior. In 1871, President Roye accepted a £100,000 loan from a British 
bank. The punishing terms of the loan meant, in the end, the Treasury only received 20% of 
the loan amount, and resulted in rioting on the streets of Monrovia. Roye was deposed and, 
Sir Harry Johnston claims, drowned trying to escape disguised as “an ordinary native or 
Kruboy”.  Despite the loan, the Liberian government struggled to maintain the value of the 23
Liberian dollar and “endure like good soldiers the present hardships”.  A poll tax was intro24 -
duced in 1860 in order to raise funds and between 1879 and 1882, the tax increased. Refusal 
or inability to pay was punished with compulsory labor, which allowed a legal avenue for the 
impressment of young men into work on private plantations.   25
While the government suffered from a lack of funds, colonists appeared to be prospering in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Americo-Liberians were able to build on the exper-
imental farms developed in the first half of the century, as well as the capital brought by 
wealthier settlers and earned in the propagation of trade to develop a thriving export market 
in coffee and sugar.  These plantations were staffed  mainly by the recaptive apprentices or 26
labourers employed from surrounding areas.  The success of these crops, the high prices 27
they attained on the world market, and the cheapness of labour allowed Americo-Liberians to 
 Harry Johnston, Liberia (New York, 1906), 262.23
 Statement of President A. W. Gardner to the Legislature, 12 December 1878, Foreign Relations of 24
the United States, (FRUS) 1875 vol. II
 Ordinance Related to Poll Tax, 1860 and Ordinance Related to Poll Tax, 1879 (Louis B. Grimes 25
Papers. Microfilm. Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York).
 As William E. Allen notes, previous scholarship on Liberian agriculture which placed the blame for 26
the failure of agricultural production in Liberia on the ‘laziness’ and ‘antipathy’ of the settlers to man-
ual labour failed to acknowledge the more significant role of lack of capital, labour and expertise of 
the early settlers. William E. Allen, “Sugar and Coffee: a History of Settler Agriculture in Nineteenth-
Century Liberia” (Ph.D. diss., Florida International University, 2002).
 William E. Allen, “Liberia and the Atlantic World in the Nineteenth Century: Convergence and Ef27 -
fects,” History in Africa 37 (2010): 7–49, 34.
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invest in their towns, as well as in the material trappings of success.  But the commercial 28
riches of the colonists attracted the attention of outside observers. 
European colonial governments started pressing at Liberia’s borders in the 1860s.  But the 29
Berlin Conference of 1884-5 marked a new phase in competition for territory in Africa. 
While Liberian merchants had long jostled for trading space with European merchants along 
the coast, the French and British colonies in West Africa began encroaching on Liberian land 
in the interior from the 1880s.  President Johnson’s inaugural address in 1884 noted the 30
problem and suggested that the solution was, “the establishment of settlements at the north-
western and southeastern boundaries of the Republic.”  These efforts were rarely successful 31
due to a lack of resources and the rival European nations were able to claim that the Liberian 
government failed the test of “effective occupation” in much of its hinterland areas.  Various 32
schemes were proposed by the British to gain control of Liberian territory, including an ex-
plicit suggestion by Sir Leslie Probyn in 1908 that the Colonial Office take over the north-
western  area. As a result, in total Liberia lost roughly 25-30% of its land to their neighbours 
between 1885 and 1911.  33
In 1885, the British colonial government at Sierra Leone took possession of the coastal region 
between Sherbro and the Mano River.  And in 1892, the French occupied Liberian lands in 34
 M.B. Akan describes Americo-Liberians’ fondness for American fashions and foods, and similar 28
expensive imported goods in “Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of 
Liberia, 1841–1964,” Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études 
Africaines 7 (1973): 217–36, 219
 A full description of the impact of the Scramble for Africa on Liberia is given in John D. Harg29 -
reaves, West Africa Partitioned: Volume II The Elephants and the Grass (London, 1985), 83-100.
 George W. Ellis, “Liberia in the New Partition of West Africa,” The Journal of Race Development 9 30
(1919): 247–67.
 Quoted in Yekutiel Gershoni, “The Drawing of Liberian Boundaries in the Nineteenth Century: 31
Treaties with African Chiefs Versus Effective Occupation,” The International Journal of African His-
torical Studies 20 (1987): 293–307, 297.
 This test required government to have sufficient power to “protect existing rights, and, as the case 32
may be, freedom of trade and of transit.” Carl Schmitt argues that this article is aimed to provide “a 
guarantee of progress, civilisation, and freedom.” Schmitt quoted in Matthew Craven, “Between Law 
and History: the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the Logic of Free Trade,” London Review of 
International Law 3 (2015): 31–59, 44, fn 70.
 J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: the Quest for Democracy (Bloomington, 1987), 34-7 and map on 26.33
 Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (Oxford, 1962), 384-5.34
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the south-east adjacent to Cote d’Ivoire.  At the same time, the bottom fell out of the export 35
economy in 1898, when competition from higher-quality Brazilian coffee caused a dramatic 
fall in the price of the Liberian product.  The sugar market faced a similar decline.  This 36 37
precipitous market failure led to ever-growing reliance on foreign capital and investment.  38
Liberia’s poverty, dependence on foreign capital and trade, and the predatory interest of Eu-
ropean empires in her rich agricultural lands left the African republic vulnerable. At this 
point, the Americo-Liberian settlers started to show more interest not only in the natural re-
sources, but also in the people surrounding them.  
In 1898, President Coleman highlighted the “advantages of speedy training and incorporating 
them [indigenous people] among us”  in order to both stimulate the plummeting economy 39
and stave off European efforts to take over. With this in mind, the government granted two 
concessions to American companies in the hope that they would be able to bring new immi-
grants and penetrate the interior region with settlements.  Both companies failed to fulfil 40
their promises, but the idea of using foreign concessions to gain control of territory did not 
lose its appeal. It was at this point that “development” explicitly became part of the Liberian 
government’s policy, as a means to incorporate hinterland regions and defend them from an-
nexation.  
In 1904, President Arthur Barclay announced that, “we cannot develop the interior effectively 
until a satisfactory understanding with the resident populations is arrived at.”  To reach a 41
 Gershoni, “The Drawing of Liberian Boundaries in the Nineteenth Century,” 306.35
 A. Adu Boahen, Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880-1935 (Berkley, 1990), 127.36
 Ibrahim Sundiata, “The Rise and Decline of Kru Power: Fernando Po in the Nineteenth Century,” 37
Liberian Studies Journal VI (1975): 25–42, 23.
 Swiss zoologist, Johann Büttikofer noted in the late 19th century that for at least 20 years, trade in 38
Liberia had been carried out by three foreign companies; one German, one Dutch and an American. 
Henk Dop and Phillip Robinson (trans.), Travel Sketches From Liberia (Leiden, 2012), 494.
 James Coleman, “Inaugural Address,” Liberia Bulletin 13, November 1898, 35.39
 “An Act to Grant Certain Concessions for the Charter and Construction of a System of Railroads in 40
the Republic of Liberia,” 7, in Acts passed by the Legislature of the Republic of Liberia during the 
session 1889-1890, 21 January, 1890, in Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Dept. of State,  4 May 
1885 - 29 January 1892, Vol. 10.
 Robert A. Smith, The Emancipation of the Hinterland (Monrovia, 1964), 18.41
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“satisfactory understanding” Barclay introduced a new provincial administration and a cen-
tralised armed force to back it up; the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF). The establishment of the 
LFF, with the assistance of African-American advisors, was first aimed at pacifying the in-
termittent violent confrontations between these groups, then at securing the region for the 
Liberian government to redirect trade and taxes through the coastal regions. Barclay intro-
duced a practice of recruiting mainly from the Loma ethnic group, as well as the Gbandi, 
Mano and Kissi, which he perceived as particularly “warlike”. In fact, the Loma had long 
been victims of and participants in the regional slave trade, and the process of recruitment 
into the force offered the marginalised an opportunity for advancement and profit.  The 42
force's recruitment tactics and processes mirrored the patrimonial relations established 
through slavery. The preference for recruitment from the so-called “warlike tribes” meant that 
few Americo-Liberians were brought into the armed forces. The Kru were also under-repre-
sented. As a coastal people, they were both seen as “ethnically” unsuited to military service 
and lacking in necessary loyalty to the state. The LFF, like the similar Frontier Police in Sier-
ra Leone, became a useful escape route for marginalised and politically excluded youth, in-
cluding ex-slaves and their descendants, in the rural areas. This flurry of action resulted in a 
withdrawal of some of the threat of French and British expansionist ambitions, and an agree-
ment was signed in 1908 to establish borders provided the Liberian government agreed to 
bring borderlands under "effective control.”  43
The “development” of the Liberian hinterlands, also referred to as “pacification” or even 
“emancipation,” relied from the beginning on the use of force.  Control over territory went 44
hand-in-hand with control over the people. As George Ellis phrased it: “This important work 
of developing the native peoples of Liberia is inseparable from the development of the vast 
 Jairo Munive, “A Political Economic History of the Liberian State, Forced Labour and Armed Mo42 -
bilization,” Journal of Agrarian Change 11 (2011),: 357–76, 359.
 Martin Ford, “‘Pacification’ Under Pressure: a Political Economy of Liberian Intervention in Nim43 -
ba 1912-1918,” Liberian Studies Journal 14 (1989): 44–63, 45. 
 Numerous sources cite the violence of the LFF in the early 20th century “pacification.” For one 44
detailed account see, J. Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia. From ‘Paternaltarianism’ 
to State Collapse (Durham, NC,2005). Also Stephen Ellis, “The Mutual Assimilation of Elites: the 
Development of Secret Societies in Twentieth Century Liberian Politics,” in Jacqueline Knörr and 
Wilson Trajano Filho (eds.) The Powerful Presence of the Past: Integration and Conflict Along the 
Upper Guinea Coast (Leiden, 2010), 185–203
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resources of Liberian hinterlands.”  The “development” of the hinterland also entailed a 45
supply of manual labour to build trade and communications infrastructure. The LFF was giv-
en the authority to oversee labour recruitment and ensure that chiefs provided the necessary 
manpower from their areas to build and maintain a new system of roads.  
The force was also set the task of collecting the newly-established Hut Tax. This tax quickly 
became a vital source of revenue for the government-- within a decade it accounted for 
around a third of gross revenue.  The tax forced people to seek paid employment wherever 46
they could, often with ex-masters or local elites. Some even resorted to pawning their chil-
dren for the cash.  Cuthbert Christy, who headed the League of Nations’ commission of in47 -
quiry on slavery in Liberia in 1930, noted that even the Kru, who had not previously prac-
ticed pawning in order to raise cash or secure debts, resorted to it.  The practice of pawning 48
varied between different groups.  Some used pawning as a source of income or pawns as 49
plantation workers, as they were unable to effectively export crops. Meanwhile the Vai, who 
were also a more rigidly socially stratified society, made use of pawns as porters for long-dis-
tance trade, often as far as neighbouring European colonies.   50
In 1910, the Grebo rebelled against the imposition of the Hut Tax and forced labour, calling 
on the British to provide them protection. In response, the Liberian government called for the 
support of the US Navy. Support came, in the form of the USS Birmingham, but its comman-
der, W. B. Fletcher, was sympathetic to the complaints of the Grebo and scornful of the Liber-
ian government, arguing that “there are no public improvements under way inaugurated by 
 George W. Ellis, “Political Institutions in Liberia,” The American Political Science Review, 5 45
(1911): 213–23, 218.
 M. B. Akpan, “Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia, 46
1841–1964,” Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 7 
(1973): 217–36, 230.
 Munive, “A Political Economic History of the Liberian State,” 361.47
 Cuthbert Christy, “Liberia in 1930,” The Geographical Journal, 77 (1931): 515–40, 537.48
 Sawyer, The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia, 223. 49
 Report to the Financial Adviser R.L., copy to H.E. the President, ‘Conditions in the Liberian Hin50 -
terland since the effective date of the New Interior Regulations which were Approved May 1st 1931’, 
November 28, 1931. Treasury Department, Monrovia in D. Elwood Dunn (ed.), The Annual Messages 
of the Presidents of Liberia 1848-2010 (Berlin, 2011), 813.
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the Liberians and there never will be while the country is in the hands of the present Gov-
ernment.”  This conflict was followed in short order by a Kru rebellion in 1912, when the 51
indigenous communities again called for British protection, even hoisting Union Jacks.  52
Conflict again broke out in 1912 with the Dan as a result of tensions between a British rubber 
concession and Mandingo traders from French-controlled Guinea. This was followed by fur-
ther antagonisms with a group of Kru, apparently armed by Germans, over a prisoner charged 
with murder  by the government.  The Liberian government was facing the prospect of al53 -
liances between European colonial powers and its own discontented population. At the same 
time, the government had taken out an even larger loan from American, British, German and 
Dutch sources in order to service the previous debt burden. This entailed turning over control 
of customs revenue to British and American officials. President Howard justified this loss of 
sovereignty in his inaugural address by claiming that, “If the temporary management in the 
hands of others of a part of our government machinery will result in actual and permanent 
independence and international respect, which I firmly believe will be the outcome, then it 
becomes our imperative duty as patriotic citizens to make such a necessary and noble sacri-
fice.”  The Liberian government was losing its grip, not only on the hinterland, but also on 54
central functions of the government.  
The First World War increased tensions. T.C. Mitchell, Commissioner General of the Hinter-
land of Liberia, ordered Liberian soldiers to ambush, capture or shoot any traders from 
French-owned Guinea seen in the hostile areas.  The Kru again rose up against the Liberian 55
government in 1915, this time siding with the Allies and declaring war on “Germany and 
 Letter dated from W.B. Fletcher, Commander, U.S. Navy, Cape Palmas, Liberia, April 17, 1910 to 51
the Secretary of the Navy, Washington DC. NYPL.
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Liberia” even hoisting Union Jacks.  British sympathies lay with the Kru, a suggestion was 56
even made to approve an annual stipend to encourage the Liberian government to withdraw.  57
However, while previous Kru uprisings in the late 19th century had been met with a variety 
of diplomatic measures, in 1915, the strategic needs of the First World War meant that the 
government could call on US military support to forcibly quell rebellion.  An American 58
gunboat and the Liberian Frontier Force left a wake of devastation in coastal settlements and 
a legacy of growing resentment.  
British concern meanwhile was growing over the influence of German-owned shipping and 
trading companies until Liberia formally joined the Allies in 1917.  But German naval 59
blockades and the abrupt end to German trade and shipping in Monrovia spelt financial disas-
ter for the Liberians. The end of the war and dire economic circumstances saw a renewed 
flurry of protest against the Liberian government and requests for European annexation. For 
example, in 1919 the Gola requested that the British government take over Liberia. Young 
men of the area had been preparing the ground to build barracks for the soldiers, but after the 
soldiers plundered the towns of Joi and Degeh, the men refused to work for them. In retalia-
tion, the LFF attacked and burnt several towns.  Harrison Akingbade claims that, on occa60 -
sion, these kinds of violent encounters were the first interaction people had with the Liberian 
government.   61
This labour recruitment was accompanied by the recruitment of workers, particularly the Kru 
and Grebo, for plantation labour in the Spanish colony of Fernando Po. While the Liberian 
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government was not officially involved in this private recruitment system (though some offi-
cials did profit under the table from the recruiters), it did tacitly approve the system as a 
means to introduce wage labour to the provincial regions.  Observers noted that the govern62 -
ment would demand taxes without notice, and when cash was not forthcoming LFF officers 
would confiscate not only livestock and food supplies, but also “boys” to be transported 
abroad to serve as plantation workers.  Labour for the island was also sourced by private 63
labour recruiters.  
One such recruiter, Harold Robert Taylor, published a memoir of his methods in 1939. He 
claimed that the Liberian government positively encouraged the traffic in young men due to 
the lucrative “head-tax” paid for all recruits leaving the country. He described his favoured 
method of recruiting as:  
to journey into the most remote districts of the hinterland and make an appeal to the 
cupidity of an impoverished Chief. On payment of so much per head, he would 
round up all the young men of his tribe whom he disliked, and probably suspected 
of having affairs with his many wives, and hand them over, body and soul.   64
The prospect of transportation became so feared that young men would flee before the LFF or 
the recruiters arrived. The journal of a member of the Harvard Expedition of 1926 observed 
in one town that there were “only three able-bodied men in this town and some forty to fifty 
women. All the others had been taken away by the Commissioner to work for him or had run 
away from him. The same was true of the three towns we passed through yesterday.”  In 65
those cases, “old men then were held hostage and required to work on the private farms of 
government officials until the younger men for exportation returned from the bush and sur-
rendered.”  In 1924, ex-President D.E. Howard described the situation as “The native popu66 -
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lation is held in subjugation by the frontier force which in turn is composed of tribesmen 
whose savage psychology is such that they have no hesitancy in attacking their own 
people”.  Internally divided and under tremendous pressure to prove “effective occupation” 67
of their territory, it seemed as though Liberia could not survive as an independent nation. 
Barclay’s development plan to bring the hinterland under centralised control had resulted 
only in exploitation of and violence towards the indigenous population.  
The Firestone Development 
It was at this critical juncture in Liberian history that Harvey Firestone was looking for a lo-
cation for rubber plantations which would allow his company to control the entire production 
process, from tree to tyre. The Stevenson Plan, implemented by the British government on 1 
January, 1922 had greatly restricted American access to rubber on the world market, and 
Firestone took it upon himself to find a solution. The slogan of the Firestone Corporation be-
came “America must grow its own rubber.”  Experts took soil samples in 1923, and by 1926 
Firestone had taken up a 99-year lease of up to one million acres of land. The Firestone cor-
porate newspaper proudly announced the deal on its front page with the headline, “Conces-
sion of Million Acres for Rubber is granted to Firestone: Reclaiming of African Jungles and 
Rebuilding Nation Comprise Plans For Great Development — Labor For Many Thousands 
When Gigantic Liberia Project is Well Under Way”.   68
The deal had the approval of the U.S. State Department, who hoped that the huge contract 
would keep Liberia within the American sphere of influence, without necessitating direct 
governmental control. The last-minute addition of a 25 million dollar loan attached to the 
concession was intended to ensure that American corporate influence dominated. A financial 
adviser selected by the American President would control the Liberian Republic’s finances 
and a US officer would act as military expert to the Frontier Force. 
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The Liberian government hoped the deal would bring them the necessary financial and mater-
ial support to develop, and thus control, rural areas. But Firestone was not the only organisa-
tion attempting to court them. Just before Firestone arrived on the scene, Marcus Garvey’s 
United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) had attempted to implement a Liberian de-
velopment project. Garvey toured the Caribbean and Central America in 1920 to 1921 raising 
funds for the scheme through the sale of Liberia Construction Loan bonds. Garvey was also 
interested in establishing rubber plantations in Liberia and offered the government the 
prospect of a stream of American Black emigrants. However, relations between the Liberian 
government and the UNIA quickly soured. The major factor seemed to be that renegotiation 
of the 1912 US loan was underway, and the Liberians feared that involvement with the UNIA 
would sour the deal.  The rejection of Garvey’s scheme in favour of the unpopular Firestone 69
concession and loan suggests that the American financial hold over Liberian government pol-
icy was considerable. 
The Firestone scheme was huge, both in its scale and duration. Preparations began before the 
first trees were planted, with improvements to the communications and transport systems. 
The building and maintenance of roads, which would be integral to the working of the planta-
tions was devolved to local chiefs to organise. In 1925, T.E. Beysolow, Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Liberia, wrote to Firestone to tell them that, “the chiefs have done their 
part well” and the roads were improving.  These intensive preparations were observed by the 70
1926 Harvard Expedition. Richard Strong counted some 85 men working on the road near the 
town Zeanshue on 30 August and complained about ongoing problems with acquiring porters, 
suggesting a lack of available men for hire.  This huge amount of manpower for the Fire71 -
stone plantations was mustered by the same systems of forced labour that had previously 
been directed towards public works.  In 1927, T.J.R. Faulkner reported that Firestone had 72
granted contracts to Allen Yancy (who would later be the central figure accused of slave-deal-
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ing in the 1930-31 League of Nations investigation) to clear land in Maryland County, and 
that he was taking road labourers and forcing them to clear land without pay.  At the same 73
time, the plantations rapidly took shape. By 1927, twelve thousand workers had planted three 
million rubber trees on fifteen thousand acres of land. 
At first it appeared that men were keen to leave forced labor at home to get paid on the plan-
tations. The Harvard Expedition reported that their hammock men would sing “Us pass on to 
Firestone, Where all is fine” as they took them through the country and that Firestone work-
ers brought small tokens of their work back to home villages which were regarded as lucky 
amulets, such as iron washers. Strong complained about ongoing problems with acquiring 
porters, suggesting a lack of available men for hire (he was offering roughly one shilling a 
day) and towards the end of his journey was forced to hire women.  However, Firestone had 74
greatly overestimated the number of available workers. Harvey Firestone had originally 
claimed that the 1 million acre concession would employ 350,000 workers. Raymond Buell, a 
Harvard researcher who visited Liberia in 1925-26, sarcastically noted that Firestone would 
need every adult man in the country on its payroll in order to achieve its objectives.  The 75
British attaché in Monrovia also observed repeatedly that Firestone seemed to have over-es-
timated the population of Liberia and there would be great difficulties in recruitment.  And, 76
despite the pressure on numbers, the transportation of labourers to Fernando Po continued, 
“against the interest of the farmers of Liberia, as well as the Firestone plantation works.”  77
The Liberian government attempted to control the situation by reviving the defunct Labour 
Bureau (which had been established but never put to use in 1912 as part of the U.S. Loan 
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agreement) to recruit and deploy labourers both for Firestone and public works.  The Bureau 78
agreed to provide ten thousand workers for the plantations, for which Firestone would pay a 
local chief and the Liberian government each one cent a day per labourer. This meant that 
workers were recruited by local chiefs, who were under pressure to deliver. Thomas J. R. 
Faulkner, opposition candidate in the 1927 Liberian presidential election, reported to Sir Eric 
Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, that chiefs were fined for failing to 
provide workers and the men often had to pawn their wives and children to pay the fines.  79
People were also being displaced; they lost land to the plantations and fled in the face of 
forced recruitment. Towns were destroyed by Firestone to make way for the planting of rub-
ber trees. For example, in 1929, King Maya Gedebeo of Twansiebo complained to the Liberia 
Legislature that nine towns had been destroyed and their oil-palms cut down. He identified 
agents such as P.J.M. School and A.B. Harper as recruiters of forced labour for Firestone. 
These demands for forced labour often resulted in young men fleeing the district. King Maya 
and his delegation asked President King, “What is to become of the natives who have been 
ruined in the way? They can only choose between forced labour and emigration.”   80
The British government registered its disapproval of the Firestone scheme from the beginning 
by highlighting the potential poor treatment of African labour. As the British Legate at Mon-
rovia put it in May 1925, “The natives would soon be converted into wage-slaves with very 
little emphasis on the wage and a great deal on the slave.”  In the British territories, labour81 -
ers were being paid one shilling and sixpence a day, while the proposed pay on Firestone 
plantations was only one shilling, when converted from dollars. And, once the depression hit, 
even those low wages were slashed. In September 1930, Firestone began to make drastic cuts 
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in response to the downturn in the world economy. eight thousand labourers on the Du and 
Cape Palmas plantations were “discharged,” those who remained took a pay cut, at first of ten 
percent, but within a week it was reported that wages were halved and food rations being dis-
tributed instead.  They also distanced themselves from the Labor Bureau, just before the 82
scandal over the Liberian use of forced labour was about to break.  
In 1929, the Liberian government was accused of tolerating and even profiting from labour 
conditions which resembled slavery. The League of Nations assembled a team to investigate, 
who took statements from complainants from various groups about the violence of the LFF 
and the problem of forced labour. This investigation raised hopes, particularly amongst the 
Kru, that the system of forced labour would come to an end. Paramount Chief Niminyo later 
told a British investigator that, “We want a Government to help us build this country. Our 
only hope of salvation is centered in the British Government. That is the prayer of the natives 
from this beach to the French boundary and the whole of the Kru Coast. We are tired.”  The 83
Kru and Grebo, exhausted by Monrovia’s constant demands for labour, still laid their hopes 
on a European Mandate over the country.  When none was forthcoming, the Kru Coast re84 -
volted yet again, and yet again resistance was violently put down by the LFF.  
While the issue of forced labour for the plantations was acknowledged, Firestone’s involve-
ment was seen as a generally positive thing. The League eventually concluded that the com-
pany was in a better position than the government to effect economic and social change. The 
report concluded that,  
if those in charge of the Firestone interests introduced a labour policy which would 
attract the necessary native labour to the plantations and keep it there, the problem 
could be solved. If model native villages were erected near the plantation, cultivable 
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land allotted and seeds and machinery advanced; if these villages were furnished 
with the conveniences and amenities of a normal i.e., a happy, healthy, family life, 
there is no doubt that numerous natives would leave their miserable forest haunts 
and become regular plantation workers.   85
Unlike President Barclay, the League, did not refer explicitly to “development.” Instead the 
emphasis was on guiding the native population through gradual changes, which would not 
move too fast. For example, the League recommended that schools be delayed until more 
progress had been made, otherwise “The educated native child will not then try, as he does 
now, to escape from his debased environment and loaf about on the coast looking for a job in 
the Government offices, which are already overcrowded with Americo-Liberians.”  On this, 86
Harvey Firestone agreed. In a 1928 magazine interview Firestone described his labour policy: 
“We believe that respect for their usual mode of life keeps them contented. But we are study-
ing their manner of living and expect to develop a program of improvement adapted to Liber-
ian customs.”  This “program of improvement” entailed the export of the “company town” 87
model from Ohio to Liberia.  
These towns were intended to not just provide worker housing, but also allow the company to 
oversee many aspects of employees’ lives. Firestone controlled education, the judicial system 
and health-care provision in the villages established on or near plantations. However, com-
plaints or inadequate provision, poor housing and low wages dogged the plantations. Despite 
Sidney De La Rue's claim in his memoir that “The production of rubber requires but little 
special skill,”  rubber production was dangerous and required some knowledge and experi88 -
ence to keep trees producing latex. Production involved three major stages: planting, produc-
tion and processing. All three stages involves specific tasks, which also relate to the life-cycle 
of the tree. Each tree is tapped with a cup to catch the latex that pours out overnight. These 
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cups were collected and taken to a central processing point or “field station” where acid is 
added as the first step in processing.  Both the acid used for processing and the burning of 89
the field to prepare for planting presented significant dangers to workers.  In addition to the 90
dangers of the work, rates of pay were kept low by deliberate collusion between Firestone 
and Americo-Liberian private plantation owners.  By the 1940s, workers on the plantation 91
had started to organise themselves to protest not just low wages and poor conditions, but also 
inadequate housing and poor provision of services on the plantations.  It is unsurprising then 92
that even after Firestone gained the right to recruit its own workers, they continued to rely on 
the coercion of local government agents. A report produced by Verité (a “fair labor” cam-
paigning organisation) with funding from the United States Department of Labor in 2012 
suggests that many people currently working on the Firestone plantations in Liberia are de-
scended from those forcibly recruited. They estimate that by 1954 around 16,000 workers had 
been forced by chiefs to work on the Firestone plantations.  93
The scandal around forced labour or slavery in the early 1930s focused on the shipping of 
labourers to Fernando Po because it more closely resembled the pattern of the slave trade and 
slavery. On the other hand, forced labour for private plantations or for public works could 
more easily be justified and regularised both as native custom and as necessary for progress. 
The main result of this international attention was that the export of labourers entirely ceased. 
But this was welcomed by the government and Firestone alike as it helped ease the labor 
shortages faced by the plantations. Firestone claimed to be a major providers of “social over-
head capital”, that is, schools, medical facilities, and roads, workers consistently preferred to 
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work at the smaller individually owned plantations. These small, local enterprises offered 
workers a place of work closer to home, the active involvement of the proprietor in settling 
any disputes and, most importantly, access to land in order to farm.  But, the end of the Sec94 -
ond World War ushered in a new phase in development policy. 
US Aid and Development 
In his memoir of serving the US military in Liberia, George “Doc” Abraham wrote that “the 
Germans knew if they could capture Firestone’s plantations, the Allies would be licked. An 
Army travels on rubber. The Germans had established a foothold in Liberia. Our mission: get 
them out and keep the rubber trees producing latex for the Allies.”  In 1941, President 95
Franklin D. Roosevelt announced on radio that Germany had moved on “a little place called 
Liberia” and pointed out to listeners that, “Liberia, of course, is awfully close to South Amer-
ica.”  As well as its proximity to the Americas, the Allies would face major difficulties if the 96
supply of rubber from Liberia were to dry up. With Japan occupying rubber-producing areas 
in Southeast Asia, the Liberian plantations were vital to the continued war effort.  As a re97 -
sult, the following year the US government signed a Defense Pact with Liberia, committing 
to further development of transport infrastructure; Robertsfield Airport was built with run-
ways long enough to land B-47 bombers.  Roosevelt visited Liberia in 1943 after the 98
Casablanca Conference and inspected the US troops stationed there, who comprised some of 
the few racially-integrated units. Following this visit, and the election of President William 
V.S. Tubman, Liberia formally entered the war in 1944 on the side of the Allies. At the con-
clusion of the war, Liberia became one of the first recipients of Point Four assistance from 
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the United States, a program of technical assistance in which U.S. “know-how” would aid 
“underdeveloped” nations to raise standards of living. 
The three stated objectives of the Department of State for Liberia were “orderly progress in 
political, social and economic development,” “political independence and territorial 
integrity,” and to “maintain our [the US’s] strategic and commercial positions in Liberia.”  99
The Firestone rubber plantations were considered both a strategic and an economic interest. 
The U.S. government took over one of Firestone’s most ambitious projects, the building of a 
deep-water harbour in Monrovia.  The budget was controlled by Secretary of State Edward 100
Stettinius and directed through the Liberia Company, formed in 1948 as a subsidiary of Stet-
tinius Associates. Stettinius even wrote most of the Liberian Maritime Code of 1948.  Point 101
Four Assistance resulted in the port of Monrovia, the founding of a ship registry, establish-
ment of Liberian international airways with the redeveloped Robertsfield airport, the begin-
ning of large-scale mining of iron ore in the region, and the creation of an international 
bank.  The United States was starting to take a significant official interest in its forgotten 102
“stepchild”.  103
The feeling was mutual. President Tubman, elected in 1943, reinforced and expanded existing 
attempts to court the dollar with his “Open Door” policy, which matched the American drive 
to couple “profits and social progress in the underdeveloped world.” This was accompanied 
by a “National Unification Policy,” which built on previous president Barclay’s attempts to 
“develop” the people of the hinterland and bridge the long-standing divide between the in-
digenous communities and the descendants of settlers. Symbolically uniting the two different 
forms of government, Tubman became the Grand Master of Ancient Poro Society . On the 104
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political front, he finally abolished the Act of Legislature of 1913 which had established two 
different legal systems for the coastal regions and the hinterlands. The most significant out-
come of this policy was that women and so-called “natives” got the vote.   
On the subject of labour, a 1949 regulation stipulated that “all male citizens” were liable for 
forced labour for public works, in both the Hinterland and Country areas. However, due to 
the manner in which forced labour was organised, only men who lived under the rule of a 
chief would be liable. The Liberian government fell back on the argument of lifestyle, claim-
ing in response to a United Nations investigation that these labour duties remained encoded 
in law because of their “inability, for economic reasons, to provide modern substitutes for its 
citizens whose way of life was strictly tribal.”  Various other restrictions were introduced in 105
1949 stipulating that men should not be forced to work outside their home area, or during the 
farming season.  
These changes marked the beginning of a decade of extraordinary growth. Export of iron ore 
began in 1951 when the Liberian Mining Company made its first shipment from the Bomi 
Hills to its parent company, Republic Iron and Steel of Cleveland in Ohio. Between 1951 and 
1965, the newly-built railway brought 20 million tons of iron ore through the forests to Mon-
rovia. The new mines attracted workers, and their families, for example, in the early 1960s, at 
the Bomi Hills mine, the labour force numbered around 2,500 yet over 10,000 people lived in 
or around the mine.  By 1965, Liberia was one of the main producers of iron ore: four out 106
of the seven West African iron ore mines were located in Liberia and rates of production sug-
gest they employed over 12,000 workers. Production increased from 2,800 tons in 1960 to 
15,000 in 1965.  The Liberian shipping register, implemented by the Department of State in 107
the immediate post-war period, proved popular thanks to its lax oversight and low cost. By 
the mid-sixties, Liberia had surpassed the United Kingdom as the world’s largest shipping 
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register.  It was a boom time, and Liberia’s economy was only second to Japan’s in terms of 108
growth worldwide in this period. Between 1953 and 1962, growth measured 6.7% and be-
tween 1963 and 1972, it leapt to a dizzying 19.2%. The new-found wealth allowed Liberia to 
finally divest itself of the restrictive loan from Firestone. In 1956, a statue of President Tub-
man was erected and a plaque attached which read, “This Monument erected by the people of 
Liberia is dedicated to the great relief brought to the Country by the Tubman administration 
in the retirement of the Loan with its humiliating and strangulating effects on the economy of 
the Nation.” 
The influx of capital led to rising employment and incomes as well as new roads, railways 
and settlements. But little appeared to have changed in terms of conditions for workers. An 
investigation by the United States Department of Labor in 1959 found that Firestone still re-
cruited labourers through “informal palaver,” where the chiefs specified both the number of 
workers and the length of their term of employment in order to be able to control when they 
should return to assist in road-building, land clearance and other “tribal work”. Chiefs often 
refused workers permission to take families with them to the plantations in order to ensure 
their return to home districts.   109
A World Bank report of 1963 suggests that wage rates were marginally higher in the mining 
industry than on plantations for unskilled labour (at 50 cents as opposed to 37 cents a day) 
and so coercion was needed to keep the rubber supply going.  The policy of forced recruit110 -
ment maintained low wages, and a study in 1961 found that a strikingly small percentage of 
gross domestic money income (just over 30%) accrued to wage and salary employees in 
1960, because of forced recruitment of unskilled workers.  The new-found wealth was ac111 -
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cruing mainly to foreign firms and the Americo-Liberian elite. The government attempted to 
control the workforce through legislation. In September 1960 the Annual Report of the De-
partment of Agriculture and Commerce suggested using the vagrancy law to fill gaps in em-
ployment. In 1964, Tubman’s new vagrancy law permitted the mining companies to evict the 
families of workers who had accumulated in the nearby “boom towns.”  State provision of 112
services, particularly education, remained poor. While Firestone tried to fill that gap, in order 
to attract and keep workers on its plantations, the lack of access to land or to social institu-
tions to protect their rights continued to make workers reluctant to work there.  
The 1960s saw various explanations put forward for this state of underdevelopment. Blame 
was popularly laid at the feet of the “native African.” For example, journalist Harold H. Mar-
tin opined that, “The African of the hinterland could not break his tribal bonds and hire him-
self out as a free agent without destroying the whole structure of the communal society under 
which he lived.”  In academic circles, the fault was seen to lie with a combination of the 113
natural environment and the Liberian leadership. In 1966 a landmark study was published, 
titled Growth with development: An economic survey of Liberia, by a team from Northwest-
ern University. They had conducted a two-year survey of economic and social conditions in 
Liberia and diagnosed the nation with a “resource curse.” The rich seams of iron and fast-
growing rubber plantations might have brought “Islands of modern industrialisation and set-
tlement in the midst of a forest region of bush-fallow cultivators,”  but they had done little 114
to improve the living conditions of the unskilled labour on which the economy relied. For the 
Americo-Liberian government, though, lack of foreign involvement was seen to be at fault. 
When President Tubman met U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon in 1957, he was keen to 
stress the economic and social advantages that colonised nations had over Liberia.  The 115
Liberian government still lacked territorial control.  
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The continued reports of the use of forced labour, particularly for the Firestone plantations, 
triggered another investigation, this time by the United Nations, in 1961. “Development” was 
again the prescribed solution. Interest in the potential of development was at a high in the 
1960s, as economist George Dalton (a member of the Northwestern team) put it: “Anthropol-
ogists, economists, historians, sociologists, political scientists — we are all developers 
now.”  The United Nations launched a new programme of development assistance, this time 116
themed around the concept of “community development.” This idea, which had also become 
popular in the British Empire also, was defined by the U.N. as “processes by which the ef-
forts of the people themselves are united with those of government authorities to improve the 
economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into 
the life of the nation, and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress.”  The flag117 -
ship project was one at Kpain, which was intended to be “a model community development 
project geared towards increased and efficient production.”  The intention was to resettle 118
families on small holdings in Kpain. The families could then be directed to produce a wide 
variety of crops, not only for substance but also cash crops. The project was designed to be 
self-sustaining, and cheap. Families were responsible for the construction of their own homes 
assisted by the African “tradition of co-operative activity”, that is free labour provided by 
their home villages.   119
From the beginning, though, the provision of labour proved to be problematic. United Na-
tions adviser William R. Miner noted in his first report that he had “heard a lot of talk about 
villages which do not cooperate and about making people do things…The use of force is all 
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too prevalent.”  Later,  W.M. Harding, Community Development Advisor, argued that the 120
problem lay in the dislike people had towards what he called “statutory labor,” that is, labor 
for communal purposes. He observed that people willingly came together into well-organised 
work-groups, called “kus,”  in order to work on projects to benefit other individuals, but 
shied away from anything that resembled the communal labor that had been organised by 
chiefs.  The second problem faced by the community development scheme at Kpain was the 121
limited size of the small-holding. As Harding explained, a successful farmer would attract 
more dependents to his compound, but each settler family had only been assigned 25 acres of 
land. This made expansion of each household difficult. The project design, to separate the 
families from each other, each to their own small plot of land, worked directly against the 
familiar way of organising an extended family and household. The project ended up largely 
as a failure, with the plots of land being gradually taken over by local villagers or “squatters.”  
The second threat to the government’s development plan, apart from the planned resettle-
ment, was to encourage the private ownership of land. To encourage subsistence farmers to 
convert to small-holders, the government introduced various policies intended to smooth the 
process for peasant farmers to obtain title to their land. However, it was generally the elites 
who took advantage of the sale of communal or government land, leading to “the purchase of 
large tracts of land which are left unused and unimproved.”  Land titles were recognised as 122
key to the problem of underdevelopment. The U.N. resettlement program found enthusiastic 
support in some quarters from government officials who saw the difficulties that had been 
caused by the granting of huge concessions to private firms and the acquisition of massive 
landholdings by elites. However, without access to the funds and legal know-how to benefit 
from the new land ownership policies, subsistence farmers found themselves ever more mar-
ginalised.  
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Conclusion 
In 1972, a report for the International Labor Organisation concluded that Liberia’s “phenom-
enal success” in stimulating economic growth over the past twenty years had failed to bring 
about an increase in the standards of living for the general population.  The Republic re123 -
mained deeply divided. The primary problem facing the Liberian government had always 
been territorial. How could it lay claim to the hinterland regions with the small, unrepresenta-
tive settler society and government on the coast? The first scandal over forced labour in 
Liberia came at the end of a period of expansionist activity — as the Liberian government 
tried to “emancipate the hinterland” by exerting political and military control. While much 
literature on the League investigation has centered on the issue of the existence, or not, of 
slavery in the country, by putting the focus on development policies, it is possible to see how 
the practice of forced labour emerged from the civilising mission of the early settler popula-
tions.   
In some ways the Liberian government was effectively able to deploy “development” as a 
means to assert their political dominance over their territories. The expropriations of land and 
labor which occurred through the early 20th century were supported and defended by an ide-
ology of development which defined the indigenous population as “underdeveloped” and in 
need of special assistance and extraordinary measures. External pressures, including the 
threat of further incursions by neighbouring European colonies or of the imposition of an in-
ternational mandate over the republic, accelerated the need to bring borderlands under “effec-
tive control” and foreign capital investment and expropriation of land could be justified as 
developmental measures.  
In order to do this, without a large settler population willing to move into those regions, it 
turned to systems of forced labour. The privatisation of development policy between 1926 
and 1946 resulted in the Firestone corporation wielding unprecedented power over the gov-
ernment. The collusion between Firestone and government officials to keep wages low and 
coerce workers onto the plantations was at best substantially overlooked, at worst regarded as 
a form of “development” in itself. With the arrival of substantial US government aid and 
technical assistance at the end of World War Two large-scale infrastructure projects could be 
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completed. Yet, very little changed in terms of labour recruitment or conditions, as policies 
and practices keeping labour costs low were maintained. 
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